“Agent wallet” covers both crypto wallets that sign onchain transactions and fiat payment accounts that authorize cards or API charges. The security trade-offs are different, so chain count is a poor way to rank them.
I compared 17 products that expose a wallet, CLI, skill or payment account to an agent. The quick read is:
- Crypto/onchain wallets: Coinbase, Circle, Cobo, Emblem, Ledger, MetaMask, OKX, OneKey, Openfort, Trust Wallet, Vincent and MoonPay's Open Wallet Standard.
- Fiat payment accounts: Stripe's Link Agent Wallet is the clearest example: it issues scoped one-time cards or payment tokens and keeps the underlying card away from the agent.
- Mixed payment products: AgentWallet.ai, Cloudflare Wallets + Agentic Payments, Lobster.cash and Skyfire combine cards, hosted balances or API-payment rails with crypto. Cloudflare Wallets themselves start with stablecoins; Cloudflare's MPP integration adds card payments through Stripe, and the wallet handles currently only reserve a place in the rollout.
Safe, ZeroDev, Turnkey, Privy and Crossmint are covered separately because they are mostly infrastructure used to assemble a wallet product.
Crypto wallets and fiat payment accounts are different
An onchain wallet controls an address or smart account. The agent may create calldata, sign it or ask a signer to sign it, so contract targeting, token risk and chain replay matter.
A fiat account usually never gives the agent a private key. It gives the agent a scoped card, payment token or API capability. The failure mode changes from “the agent calls a malicious contract” to “the agent buys the wrong thing, loops charges or spends through a linked balance.” Merchant identity, amount, expiry, approval and refund handling become the key controls.
Cloudflare sits between the two: its announced Account Wallets and Virtual Wallets are provider-managed stablecoin balances, while its Agents SDK supports both x402 stablecoin payments and MPP card payments. Stripe's Link Agent Wallet is the fiat-first product in this set.
What I counted as an agent wallet
I care about products mainly built or designed for agents: something an agent can use to hold value, request signatures or make payments. The main developer decision is practical: use one of these agent wallets, or keep a normal wallet and make the agent operate through tightly limited tools.
If you choose that route, keep the balance very low and understand the failure mode: a prompt injection or compromised tool can still make a valid transaction that drains the wallet. At minimum, use something like Varlock to keep real secrets out of the agent's context; mlld may also make sense when you need auditable scripts and runtime guards around tool calls. Neither replaces wallet policy.
The ten criteria
| Criterion | What I checked | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Custody model | Whether a vendor server can authorize, sign or settle an operation | A remote RPC or simulation service alone does not make a wallet custodial |
| Settlement rail | Whether value settles onchain, through fiat rails, or through both | The right threat model for a contract call is different from the right threat model for a card charge |
| Open-source coverage | Core wallet, signer, contracts, SDK and skills separately | An MIT-licensed client does not open a hosted signing backend |
| Privacy | Key secrecy, vendor visibility and public-chain linkability | “Non-custodial” is not the same as private |
| Key management | Raw key, local vault, hardware, MPC, TEE or threshold network | This determines what a prompt injection or host compromise can reach |
| Limits and permissioning | Caps, allowlists, expiry, rate limits, approvals and custom rules | A fixed daily limit and a programmable policy engine are not equivalent |
| Transaction security | Simulation, decoding, phishing, token and approval scanning | A permitted transaction can still be a scam |
| Skills and contract knowledge | Official skills, recipes, catalogs and contract restrictions | Agents should not invent an address from search results |
| Control and recovery | Export, revocation, self-hosting and vendor dependence | The wallet needs an exit path when the agent or provider fails |
| Reach | Chains, cards, x402 and supported actions | “Multichain” often applies to addresses, not every wallet feature |
The cards below separate those fields. Use the settlement filter to split crypto from fiat, then read the custody and permission caveats. There is no composite score and no paid placement.
Interactive comparison · checked 24 September 2026
Compare 17 agent wallets and payment accounts
Filters use AND between groups and OR within a group. Settlement rail separates onchain crypto from fiat payments and mixed products. “Open” describes the public code surface, not necessarily the hosted backend.
Filter the comparison
Showing 17 of 17
Alphabetical · no paid placement · no overall score
AgentWallet
AgentWallet.ai
A payment account for agents that combines USDC, cards, AP2 and x402 with an approval engine.
Settlement
Mixed rails
Custody
Custodial
Safety
Policy controls only
Permissions
Per-transaction, daily and monthly caps plus merchant, category, country and approval rules. The API token identifies the agent; the human principal controls policy.
Contract knowledge
Not documented
Read the security notes
- Custody model
- Identity, approvals, card rules and accounting are hosted. USDC settlement is onchain; card settlement is not.
- Key boundary
- Its crypto wallet delegates signing to Coinbase CDP HSM infrastructure. API and wallet credentials can sit in the agent process, but the wallet private key does not. AP2 mandate keys use server-side encrypted storage, which is a separate trust surface.
- Limits and permissions
- Per-transaction, daily and monthly caps plus merchant, category, country and approval rules. The API token identifies the agent; the human principal controls policy.
- Transaction safety
- Strong payment-policy controls, but no public general-purpose token or contract scam scanner is documented.
- Skills / verified contracts
- MCP/API payment tools are documented. A signed or curated smart-contract registry is not.
- Privacy surface
- The service and its payment partners can observe account and payment metadata; public-chain transfers remain linkable. The privacy policy is not a private-transaction system.
- Control and exit
- The crypto key is tied to the hosted Coinbase CDP wallet record; card and approval features are service-specific.
- Reach
- USDC wallet actions, agent cards where supported, AP2 mandates and x402 payments.
Circle
Circle Agent Wallets
Headless USDC-first wallets with trading, bridging, contract calls and a curated agent marketplace.
Settlement
Onchain crypto
Custody
Custodial
Safety
Policy controls only
Permissions
Custom mainnet policies are managed in the companion experience and policy changes require an email OTP. The user secret is the operational capability, so its handling still matters.
Contract knowledge
Curated catalog
Read the security notes
- Custody model
- Circle hosts wallet orchestration, policy checks and authentication. Transfers, swaps and contract calls settle on supported chains.
- Key boundary
- Built on Circle User-Controlled Wallets with 2-of-2 MPC. The agent invokes operations with a user secret credential; the key shares are not exposed to the model or agent process as a complete private key.
- Limits and permissions
- Custom mainnet policies are managed in the companion experience and policy changes require an email OTP. The user secret is the operational capability, so its handling still matters.
- Transaction safety
- Policy and user-authentication controls are documented; a general token-risk or malicious-contract scanner is not.
- Skills / verified contracts
- Circle offers a curated Agent Marketplace and built-in actions. That reduces arbitrary discovery, but is not a universal contract whitelist.
- Privacy surface
- Circle sees wallet and service activity, while balances and transactions on public chains are public. No private mempool or shielded execution is documented.
- Control and exit
- MPC custody and policy management depend on Circle. Assets remain transferable onchain, but the wallet control plane is not self-hosted.
- Reach
- USDC across Arbitrum, Avalanche, Base, Ethereum, Monad, OP, Polygon, Unichain and Circle's Arc testnet in the current support list.
Cloudflare
Cloudflare Wallets + Agentic Payments
A planned Account Wallet / Virtual Wallet system for agent purchases, with x402 stablecoins and MPP card rails in the Agents SDK.
Settlement
Mixed rails
Custody
Custodial
Safety
Policy controls only
Permissions
The announced model includes an allowance, approved merchant list and maximum transaction size set by the Account Wallet owner. The docs do not yet show the production policy API or independent enforcement details.
Contract knowledge
Build-your-own framework
Read the security notes
- Custody model
- Cloudflare describes Account Wallets funding Virtual Wallets that agents use through API keys. The wallet service and payment protocols are provider-managed; current handles only reserve a place in the rollout.
- Key boundary
- Virtual Wallets are assigned to agents through API keys. Cloudflare has not yet published a raw-key, MPC, enclave or self-hosting design for the wallet signer, so treat the API credential as the main capability boundary.
- Limits and permissions
- The announced model includes an allowance, approved merchant list and maximum transaction size set by the Account Wallet owner. The docs do not yet show the production policy API or independent enforcement details.
- Transaction safety
- Spending caps and merchant allowlists are planned policy controls. Cloudflare's MPP/x402 flow does not document a general smart-contract, token-risk or merchant scam scanner.
- Skills / verified contracts
- Cloudflare publishes Agentic Payments docs and skills, while x402/MPP describe how a server presents a payment challenge. That is payment-protocol knowledge, not a verified contract registry.
- Privacy surface
- Cloudflare and payment facilitators can observe agent identity, payment challenges and settlement metadata; x402 transactions remain public. No private transaction feature is documented.
- Control and exit
- The wallet handle, Account Wallet policy and Virtual Wallet balance depend on Cloudflare. MPP and x402 are portable protocols, but the wallet control plane is not currently self-hosted.
- Reach
- Agent purchases for APIs, MCP tools and content. Cloudflare Wallets start with stablecoins; MPP adds card payments through Stripe and x402 adds onchain stablecoins.
Cobo
Cobo Agentic Wallet
An MPC wallet service where owners approve bounded agent capabilities called Pacts.
Settlement
Onchain crypto
Custody
Custodial
Safety
Policy controls only
Permissions
Owners approve Pacts scoped by chain, asset, amount and action. A Pact then issues a limited API credential to the agent, with activity visible in audit logs.
Contract knowledge
Bundled skills
Read the security notes
- Custody model
- Pact authorization, MPC signing and workflow orchestration are service-side; resulting transactions execute onchain.
- Key boundary
- MPC avoids assembling a complete private key in the agent. A Pact-scoped API key can be placed in the runtime; it is a capability token, not a raw wallet key, and still needs secret handling.
- Limits and permissions
- Owners approve Pacts scoped by chain, asset, amount and action. A Pact then issues a limited API credential to the agent, with activity visible in audit logs.
- Transaction safety
- Pact restrictions can prevent out-of-scope transfers. Public material does not document a general honeypot, phishing or malicious-contract scanner.
- Skills / verified contracts
- The open recipe/SDK layer supplies known workflows. Treat a recipe as integration guidance, not proof that every called contract is continuously verified.
- Privacy surface
- Cobo can observe policy and signing requests, and public-chain activity is linkable. No shielded transaction path is documented.
- Control and exit
- The SDK and recipes are public, while MPC custody, Pact issuance and policy services depend on Cobo.
- Reach
- Cobo claims broad multichain coverage; exact support varies by operation and should be checked per recipe.
Coinbase
Coinbase Agentic Wallet
An email-onboarded agent wallet with funding, sends, trading and x402 skills.
Settlement
Onchain crypto
Custody
Custodial
Safety
Policy controls only
Permissions
Users set maximum spend per call and per session in the wallet UI. The agent cannot raise those limits. Broader CDP policy APIs exist, but they should not be assumed to be part of every Agentic Wallet flow.
Contract knowledge
Bundled skills
Read the security notes
- Custody model
- Authentication, limits and signing are hosted. Trades and transfers settle on Base, Solana or other currently supported networks.
- Key boundary
- CDP signing happens inside an AWS Nitro Enclave. The wallet secret authenticates requests and can live in the agent environment, but it is not the private key; compromise can still authorize allowed operations.
- Limits and permissions
- Users set maximum spend per call and per session in the wallet UI. The agent cannot raise those limits. Broader CDP policy APIs exist, but they should not be assumed to be part of every Agentic Wallet flow.
- Transaction safety
- The documented agent product provides spend boundaries, not a general token-risk or rug-pull detector.
- Skills / verified contracts
- Official open skills cover authentication, funding, sends, trading and x402. They narrow tool usage but do not form a universal verified-contract registry.
- Privacy surface
- Coinbase processes wallet requests and account metadata; onchain activity is public. The enclave protects key use, not transaction privacy.
- Control and exit
- The wallet and policy service are Coinbase-hosted. Skills are portable source code, while the underlying signing account is not self-hosted.
- Reach
- Base, Solana and selected EVM networks, plus x402 discovery and payment tools.
Emblem
Emblem Agent Wallet
A large tool catalog around a persistent wallet, with explicit approval for wallet-changing actions.
Settlement
Onchain crypto
Custody
Custodial
Safety
Approval gate only
Permissions
Every wallet-modifying action requires explicit approval. That limits unattended autonomy rather than creating fine-grained autonomous policy.
Contract knowledge
Bundled skills
Read the security notes
- Custody model
- Emblem's tool, OAuth and approval services sit in the wallet path; approved crypto actions are then submitted to the chain.
- Key boundary
- Public materials describe a deterministic persistent wallet and password-based access, but do not clearly document the signer boundary, encryption design or whether a raw key can reach the local agent runtime.
- Limits and permissions
- Every wallet-modifying action requires explicit approval. That limits unattended autonomy rather than creating fine-grained autonomous policy.
- Transaction safety
- Human approval is the primary guardrail. A separate transaction simulation or scam-screening service is not clearly documented.
- Skills / verified contracts
- The open CLI, MCP server and agent-skills repository provide a broad known-tool catalog. That is useful context, but not a documented contract allowlist.
- Privacy surface
- OAuth, approvals and hosted tool use create service-visible metadata, while chain activity remains public. Privacy-preserving execution is not documented.
- Control and exit
- Client code is public; the hosted tool and wallet service remain a dependency. Key export and recovery details need confirmation before production use.
- Reach
- The repository documents several EVM chains plus Bitcoin and Solana; product pages claim a wider tool surface than wallet-chain support.
Ledger
Ledger Agent Intent
An agent proposes an intent; the owner reviews transaction details and signs on Ledger hardware.
Settlement
Onchain crypto
Custody
Self-custodial
Safety
Built-in screening
Permissions
The current beta lets an agent propose sends. Every fund-moving operation requires device review and approval; revocation is also owner-controlled.
Contract knowledge
Bundled skills
Read the security notes
- Custody model
- Ledger's intent service handles proposals and checks, but the private key stays on the device; only a physically approved transaction can leave it.
- Key boundary
- The wallet private key remains in Ledger hardware. The agent creates its own identity key for the intent service, but cannot use that key to sign wallet transactions.
- Limits and permissions
- The current beta lets an agent propose sends. Every fund-moving operation requires device review and approval; revocation is also owner-controlled.
- Transaction safety
- Transaction Check and Clear Signing help the human inspect the destination and meaning before approval. Safety still depends on the user reading the device.
- Skills / verified contracts
- Ledger CLI ships agent-oriented instructions. The current beta exposes a narrow intent set rather than a general verified DeFi contract catalog.
- Privacy surface
- Ledger's backend can observe intent-service traffic, and final transfers are public. Hardware isolation protects the key, not the transaction graph.
- Control and exit
- Control is anchored to Ledger hardware and its services. The onchain account remains a normal account, but the agent workflow is vendor-specific.
- Reach
- Ethereum sends in the current beta; swaps and Solana are documented as in development.
Stripe
Link Agent Wallet
A consumer fiat wallet where an agent requests purchases through one-time cards or scoped payment tokens without seeing the underlying card.
Settlement
Fiat payments
Custody
Custodial
Safety
Approval gate only
Permissions
The current product requires approval for each purchase and lets the user disconnect the agent. Granular rules for spending with or without approval are listed as coming soon.
Contract knowledge
Not documented
Read the security notes
- Custody model
- Link and its payment partners authorize and settle the card purchase. The agent does not self-custody a bank balance or card number; the user remains the approval boundary.
- Key boundary
- Link says the agent's payment credentials are never exposed and can use one-time-use cards or Shared Payment Tokens. The agent receives a scoped capability, not the underlying card details.
- Limits and permissions
- The current product requires approval for each purchase and lets the user disconnect the agent. Granular rules for spending with or without approval are listed as coming soon.
- Transaction safety
- The Link app shows the merchant, amount and purchase context before approval. This is a human approval surface, not a general merchant-fraud or content-safety scanner for agent decisions.
- Skills / verified contracts
- Link provides a skill.md onboarding path for agents. It does not document a trusted merchant registry or a contract allowlist because settlement is fiat card payment.
- Privacy surface
- Link processes account, shipping, order and payment metadata, and its terms explain that connected agents may receive data needed to complete a purchase. This is not an unlinkable payment system.
- Control and exit
- Users can disconnect an agent from Link settings or revoke access through the agent platform. The payment account, history and one-time-card service remain Link-controlled.
- Reach
- Online purchases using supported cards through one-time-use cards or Shared Payment Tokens; currently available to US consumers.
Crossmint
Lobster.cash
A local CLI and skills package for Solana USDC plus agent-requested virtual cards.
Settlement
Mixed rails
Custody
Hybrid
Safety
Approval gate only
Permissions
Card issuance is requested by the agent and approved by a human. Service-level spending limits apply to cards; direct crypto actions depend on the local wallet flow.
Contract knowledge
Bundled skills
Read the security notes
- Custody model
- Solana signing is local and self-custodial, while virtual-card authorization and settlement use Crossmint and payment-rail services.
- Key boundary
- The CLI stores agent and wallet material in a local file with restrictive file permissions. The signer is therefore reachable by the local runtime; no hardware or enclave boundary is documented.
- Limits and permissions
- Card issuance is requested by the agent and approved by a human. Service-level spending limits apply to cards; direct crypto actions depend on the local wallet flow.
- Transaction safety
- Human card approval and issuer rules provide payment guardrails. A general Solana token or program scam scanner is not documented.
- Skills / verified contracts
- The open skills package provides official wallet and card actions. It is not a verified Solana-program registry.
- Privacy surface
- Local wallet state reduces cloud key exposure, but Crossmint and card partners see card activity; Solana transactions are public.
- Control and exit
- The local wallet is more portable than the card service. The open CLI is inspectable, while card issuance remains provider-dependent.
- Reach
- Solana USDC transfers and virtual-card payments in supported regions.
MetaMask
MetaMask Agent Wallet
A CLI/SDK wallet with guarded hosted signing or a local bring-your-own-key mode.
Settlement
Onchain crypto
Custody
Hybrid
Safety
Built-in screening
Permissions
Guard mode supports token and contract allowlists plus a rolling outflow cap and MFA exceptions. Beast mode removes those Guard restrictions for more autonomy.
Contract knowledge
Bundled skills
Read the security notes
- Custody model
- The hosted mode puts policy, simulation, screening, MFA and signing in MetaMask services; BYOK keeps signing local. Either mode submits a normal chain transaction, so this is hybrid.
- Key boundary
- Server-wallet keys are TEE-isolated. BYOK signs locally and can receive its mnemonic through environment/configuration, optionally protected by MM_PASSWORD; that mode gives the agent process a much larger secret-handling burden.
- Limits and permissions
- Guard mode supports token and contract allowlists plus a rolling outflow cap and MFA exceptions. Beast mode removes those Guard restrictions for more autonomy.
- Transaction safety
- Simulation and Blockaid scanning are built into the documented flow. The detailed architecture places them in the hosted path, not in an onchain policy contract.
- Skills / verified contracts
- Official quickstarts and packaged actions exist, while Guard allowlists let an operator define trusted targets. No universal signed contract registry is documented.
- Privacy surface
- The hosted service can observe intent, simulation and signing metadata; BYOK moves signing local but still submits through service paths. Public-chain activity remains linkable.
- Control and exit
- BYOK is the portable path. Server-wallet signing, Guard policy, analytics and recovery depend on MetaMask services.
- Reach
- EVM networks are documented in detail; the product also advertises Solana support, with feature coverage varying by chain.
MoonPay
MoonPay Agents / OWS
An open local wallet standard plus MoonPay skills and optional crypto-funded agent cards.
Settlement
Mixed rails
Custody
Hybrid
Safety
Policy controls only
Permissions
Pre-sign policies can constrain chain, expiry and actions, and can call custom local policy executables. This is unusually customizable but only as strong as the host running it.
Contract knowledge
Bundled skills
Read the security notes
- Custody model
- Wallet storage, policy and signing run locally; crypto transactions settle onchain. Card activity uses conventional payment rails.
- Key boundary
- Open Wallet Standard stores encrypted wallet material in a local vault or OS-backed keychain. Its API is designed not to return raw private keys, although a compromised local runtime could still request permitted signatures.
- Limits and permissions
- Pre-sign policies can constrain chain, expiry and actions, and can call custom local policy executables. This is unusually customizable but only as strong as the host running it.
- Transaction safety
- The policy engine can block disallowed actions. The skills documentation explicitly says skill instructions are not a security boundary; a universal scam scanner is not documented.
- Skills / verified contracts
- MoonPay publishes a broad skills repository with known commands. Those skills reduce ad-hoc browsing but do not guarantee every downstream contract is allowlisted.
- Privacy surface
- Keys and policy can stay local. RPCs, MoonPay services, counterparties and public chains can still see transaction or payment metadata.
- Control and exit
- The MIT-licensed wallet core is locally runnable and is the strongest portability story in this set. MoonPay-specific funding and card features remain hosted.
- Reach
- Broad EVM, Solana and Bitcoin-family wallet support, MoonPay funding, and optional card spending.
OKX
OKX Agentic Wallet
A TEE-backed wallet in OKX OnchainOS with transaction risk checks and official agent skills.
Settlement
Onchain crypto
Custody
Custodial
Safety
Built-in screening
Permissions
Subwallets and API credentials separate agents and workloads. Public docs emphasize managed access and risk checks more than a deeply customizable owner policy language.
Contract knowledge
Curated catalog
Read the security notes
- Custody model
- Wallet management, signing and risk checks run in OKX-hosted infrastructure; accepted actions execute onchain.
- Key boundary
- Private-key generation and signing are described as TEE-isolated. OKX API credentials may be supplied to the agent through environment variables, but those credentials are not the wallet private key and remain sensitive capabilities.
- Limits and permissions
- Subwallets and API credentials separate agents and workloads. Public docs emphasize managed access and risk checks more than a deeply customizable owner policy language.
- Transaction safety
- Official skills expose token-risk, honeypot/tax, dapp phishing, transaction, signature and approval checks. This is the broadest documented screening surface in the set.
- Skills / verified contracts
- Official skills and dapp discovery route agents toward supported actions and known integrations. Verify whether a result is merely discovered or explicitly vetted before treating it as an allowlist.
- Privacy surface
- OKX can observe wallet and risk-service requests, and transactions are public. TEE custody does not hide behavioral metadata.
- Control and exit
- The skills are MIT-licensed; key custody, risk services and wallet orchestration remain OKX dependencies.
- Reach
- EVM and Solana wallets, trading/data tools and x402, with up to 50 documented subwallets per account.
OneKey
OneKey Agent Wallet
A skill-first session paired to OneKey software or hardware, with explicit confirmation for writes.
Settlement
Onchain crypto
Custody
Self-custodial
Safety
Built-in screening
Permissions
Current safety rules require confirmation for writes and hardware confirmation for sensitive or high-value actions. This favors supervision over unattended execution.
Contract knowledge
Bundled skills
Read the security notes
- Custody model
- OneKey services provide skills, simulation and risk checks, while the paired wallet or hardware device keeps final signing under the owner's control.
- Key boundary
- The agent pairs through an Agent Wallet Session instead of receiving a seed or private key. Hardware-backed accounts keep signing on the device.
- Limits and permissions
- Current safety rules require confirmation for writes and hardware confirmation for sensitive or high-value actions. This favors supervision over unattended execution.
- Transaction safety
- The documented flow checks token risk, approval risk, transaction simulation, and chain/address mismatch, and tells the agent to stop on high risk.
- Skills / verified contracts
- OneKey publishes a skill-oriented integration surface. Its current docs do not establish a universal signed registry of trusted contracts.
- Privacy surface
- Keys stay in the paired wallet, but RPC, simulation and security services may observe requests; public-chain transactions remain linkable.
- Control and exit
- The account can remain in OneKey software or hardware. The agent session and security flow are OneKey-specific, and the product is still private beta.
- Reach
- OneKey's multichain wallet surface, with exact agent-feature coverage subject to the private beta.
Openfort
Openfort Agent Wallets
Programmable wallets with TEE signing, session keys and open signer and smart-account components.
Settlement
Mixed rails
Custody
Hybrid
Safety
Policy controls only
Permissions
Session keys, allowlists, spend limits, expiry and smart-account policy compose into granular agent scopes. Exact enforcement depends on the selected account and signer setup.
Contract knowledge
Build-your-own framework
Read the security notes
- Custody model
- Openfort can host signing and API orchestration, while smart-account permissions and session-key constraints can also be enforced by the account contracts.
- Key boundary
- Hosted signing keeps keys in isolated infrastructure. The open OpenSigner reconstructs threshold material only ephemerally in its signing context; API and wallet secrets can still authorize calls from the agent runtime.
- Limits and permissions
- Session keys, allowlists, spend limits, expiry and smart-account policy compose into granular agent scopes. Exact enforcement depends on the selected account and signer setup.
- Transaction safety
- Policy can deny unauthorized targets or amounts. A general rug-pull or malicious-token reputation scanner is not part of the documented core.
- Skills / verified contracts
- CLI, MCP and SDK tools provide a framework for approved actions. Teams must maintain their own protocol/contract allowlists where required.
- Privacy surface
- Hosted services see orchestration metadata; onchain smart-account policies may publicly reveal permissions. No private execution layer is documented.
- Control and exit
- OpenSigner, CLI and smart-account contracts are public, improving exit options. The managed control plane is still a vendor service unless self-hosted components replace it.
- Reach
- EVM and Solana integrations plus x402, AP2, ACP and other agent-payment protocols.
Skyfire
Skyfire
A managed agent-payment account with per-agent identity and capped payment tokens for seller services.
Settlement
Mixed rails
Custody
Custodial
Safety
Policy controls only
Permissions
A payment token is seller-specific, has a maximum charge and expires between 10 seconds and 24 hours. Separate agent API keys support revocation and attribution.
Contract knowledge
Curated catalog
Read the security notes
- Custody model
- Identity, token authorization and settlement are hosted. A user can fund the managed balance with Base USDC or conventional rails, while the agent pays with Skyfire tokens.
- Key boundary
- The agent authenticates with a service API key and payment tokens rather than holding an onchain private key. Custody and settlement internals are service-managed.
- Limits and permissions
- A payment token is seller-specific, has a maximum charge and expires between 10 seconds and 24 hours. Separate agent API keys support revocation and attribution.
- Transaction safety
- Capped tokens constrain a seller's charge, and green-tagged Verified Sellers have a documented dispute guarantee. This is not a general smart-contract or token scam detector.
- Skills / verified contracts
- Official skills cover Skyfire payment flows, and the service directory distinguishes approved active services and Verified Sellers. It is a service catalog, not a DeFi contract registry.
- Privacy surface
- Skyfire and counterparties can observe payment identity and transaction metadata. The system prioritizes attributable agent commerce, not unlinkability.
- Control and exit
- API-based integrations are easy to move at the application layer, but balances, rules, identity and payment tokens depend on Skyfire.
- Reach
- Paid APIs, tools, webpages, MCP servers and agents, funded by card, bank transfer or Base USDC depending on account eligibility.
Trust Wallet
Trust Wallet Agent Kit
A local non-custodial CLI/SDK with multichain actions, risk data and configurable wallet limits.
Settlement
Onchain crypto
Custody
Self-custodial
Safety
Built-in screening
Permissions
Daily caps, asset/address allowlists and refill thresholds bound automated behavior. WalletConnect interactions retain a manual approval option.
Contract knowledge
Bundled skills
Read the security notes
- Custody model
- Wallet storage, policy, watcher automation and signing run locally; resulting transactions settle on the selected chain.
- Key boundary
- A BIP-39 seed is generated locally and stored as AES-256-GCM ciphertext. Unlocking can use an OS keychain, prompt, CLI flag or TWAK_WALLET_PASSWORD environment variable; the latter exposes the password to the process, not the decrypted mnemonic by default.
- Limits and permissions
- Daily caps, asset/address allowlists and refill thresholds bound automated behavior. WalletConnect interactions retain a manual approval option.
- Transaction safety
- Official tools expose token-risk and security checks. Because signing is local, host compromise remains the dominant failure mode.
- Skills / verified contracts
- The open skills repository gives agents a maintained set of wallet, market and security actions. It is not a blanket contract whitelist.
- Privacy surface
- Key material and policy remain local, but RPCs, quote/security APIs and public chains can observe activity. Local custody is not transaction privacy.
- Control and exit
- The open local stack and standard mnemonic support exit. Moving the seed also moves all of its risk, so recovery and host hardening matter.
- Reach
- The product describes 30+ chains; individual SDK documents and skill endpoints cover different subsets, so verify the exact action/chain pair.
Lit Protocol
Vincent
An open permission framework where Lit PKPs execute versioned abilities under user-granted policies.
Settlement
Onchain crypto
Custody
Hybrid
Safety
Simulation / decoding
Permissions
Users grant a versioned app specific abilities and policies onchain. Developers can compose spending, target and custom rules, and revoke grants.
Contract knowledge
Build-your-own framework
Read the security notes
- Custody model
- App, ability and policy grants are registered on the chain, while Lit nodes evaluate code and participate in distributed signing before a transaction is submitted.
- Key boundary
- A Lit Programmable Key Pair is controlled through distributed threshold signing; no single agent process receives a complete wallet private key. Optional smart-account session keys introduce their own scoped key material.
- Limits and permissions
- Users grant a versioned app specific abilities and policies onchain. Developers can compose spending, target and custom rules, and revoke grants.
- Transaction safety
- Smart-account abilities can decode and simulate transactions before execution. Safety quality depends on the chosen ability and policy, not a universal reputation oracle.
- Skills / verified contracts
- Versioned apps and abilities form a public, reusable capability catalog. Teams can bind known contracts in abilities, but the framework does not automatically bless every integration.
- Privacy surface
- Grants and app relationships recorded onchain are public, Lit nodes participate in execution, and final transactions are linkable. Distributed keys do not make activity private.
- Control and exit
- The framework and registries are open, but PKP execution depends on the Lit network. Smart-account integration can provide a migration path to other account systems.
- Reach
- EVM apps and smart accounts, including session-key integrations with systems such as Safe and ZeroDev.
Wallet-by-wallet target fit
This is a strict pass/fail view of the published docs: ✅ means the target feature is documented, while ❌ means it is missing, weaker or unclear. The target requires independent custody, real limits and guardrails, protected/scoped keys, trusted targets (contracts for crypto, merchants for fiat), and a usable exit path; none documents private-by-default execution.
| Wallet | Rail | Self-custody | Open source | Privacy built in | Spending limits | Tx guardrails | Contract / merchant allowlist | Scoped key | Exit path |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AgentWallet.ai | mixed | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ |
| Circle Agent Wallets | crypto | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ |
| Cloudflare Wallets + Agentic Payments | mixed | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
| Cobo Agentic Wallet | crypto | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ |
| Coinbase Agentic Wallet | crypto | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ |
| Emblem Agent Wallet | crypto | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
| Ledger Agent Intent | crypto | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ |
| Link Agent Wallet | fiat | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ |
| Lobster.cash | mixed | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅* | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |
| MetaMask Agent Wallet | crypto | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ |
| MoonPay Agents / OWS | mixed | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ |
| OKX Agentic Wallet | crypto | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ |
| OneKey Agent Wallet | crypto | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ |
| Openfort Agent Wallets | mixed | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ |
| Skyfire | mixed | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ |
| Trust Wallet Agent Kit | crypto | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ |
| Vincent | crypto | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
* Cloudflare's wallet handles are reservable, but the docs say sending, receiving and holding funds are not available yet. Lobster.cash documents card spending limits, but its direct local-wallet path does not inherit those limits. That is why the product is Mixed in the explorer.
Five conclusions from the comparison
Hiding the key does not remove spending risk
Hosted wallets increasingly keep signing keys inside a TEE, HSM or MPC system. That is safer than putting a raw private key beside the model, but the API credential still has power.
Consider an agent allowed to spend $100 with a credential that can request transfers. An attacker does not need the private key; stealing the credential is enough to spend the permitted amount. Bind it to a wallet, chain, function, amount and expiry, and enforce those rules in the signer.
Local wallets move the risk to the host: Trust Wallet encrypts a mnemonic, Open Wallet Standard uses an encrypted vault, and Lobster.cash stores wallet material locally. That removes a remote custodian, not endpoint compromise.
Most permission systems are service-side
A service-side policy is not automatically weak, but it creates a vendor dependency. MetaMask Guard, Coinbase's per-call/session limits, Cobo Pacts, AgentWallet.ai, Cloudflare's announced Virtual Wallet rules and Skyfire all enforce rules in their services. Link keeps the user in the approval loop for each purchase. Ledger and OneKey put a person or hardware device at the final boundary.
Vincent registers app, ability and policy grants onchain while Lit nodes evaluate and sign. Openfort combines hosted signing with smart-account and session-key rules. Both are hybrid. Safe's allowance module and ZeroDev's Kernel add strong account-level controls, but the builder still has to supply the signer, skills and scam checks.
A spending limit is not transaction security
“Swap up to 100 USDC through this address” can be a valid policy and still point at a malicious clone or a token with a transfer trap. Permissioning asks whether the agent may act; transaction security asks what the calldata will do. For fiat, the equivalent is a real merchant, item, amount and refund path—not merely a valid card authorization.
The strongest documented screening surfaces are:
- OKX: token-risk, honeypot/tax, dapp phishing, transaction, signature and approval checks in its official OnchainOS skills.
- MetaMask: simulation and Blockaid screening in the Agent Wallet architecture.
- OneKey: simulation plus token, approval, address and network risk checks in its safety flow.
- Ledger: Transaction Check and Clear Signing before the owner approves an intent on hardware, as documented for Agent Intent.
- Trust Wallet Agent Kit: official token-risk and security actions in its agent skills.
- Vincent: abilities can decode and simulate smart-account transactions before execution.
The other products document policy controls, human approvals or narrow payment rules, but not a general scam-screening layer. The cards say “policy only,” “approval only” or “not documented” rather than assuming one exists.
Skills help, but they are not automatically a trust root
Skills give an agent stable commands and schemas instead of ad-hoc browsing. EthSkills is a useful example: its bot-readable SKILL.md files cover wallets, security, protocols and contract addresses. Coinbase, Cobo, Ledger, Lobster.cash, MoonPay, OKX, Openfort, Skyfire and Trust Wallet publish product-specific skills; Circle has a curated marketplace; Vincent has versioned abilities.
That is useful context, not a trust root. A skill can still fetch an arbitrary route or accept the wrong contract address. The trusted layer needs a chain-specific allowlist, function constraints, signed updates and a default-deny path. The cards treat skills and verified contracts as separate fields.
For high-value agents, I would require a separate registry with:
- chain-specific contract addresses and code hashes;
- allowed functions and parameter constraints;
- the source and review date for every entry;
- a signed update process;
- simulation against the exact transaction the signer will authorize;
- a default-deny path when the registry and live chain disagree.
OKX discovery, Circle's marketplace, Vincent's abilities, and MetaMask/Openfort target policies are useful pieces. None is a universal, continuously verified contract knowledgebase.
Key privacy and transaction privacy are different
Unfortunately, none of the wallet providers in this comparison adds a private-transaction feature. If you build your own wallet, the Ethereum Foundation's Kohaku is a privacy-first toolkit with shielded-pool components and provider/account abstractions. The repository warns that some packages are still work in progress and unaudited, so treat it as building material rather than a production guarantee.
Where Safe, ZeroDev, Turnkey, Privy and Crossmint fit
These five belong in the architecture map, but not all belong in the wallet grid.
| Product | What it contributes | Why it is outside the 17 product cards |
|---|---|---|
| Safe | Open EVM smart accounts, multiple signers, human approval, modules, onchain allowances and agent action examples | It is the account and authorization layer. The builder still chooses the agent signer, secret storage, tools and threat screening |
| ZeroDev | Kernel smart accounts with composable session-key, call, gas, signature, rate and time policies | It is an excellent permission substrate, but its quickstart deliberately brings an external signer and AgentKit runtime |
| Turnkey | Enclave key generation/signing, policy evaluation, delegated API access, multichain transaction management and AI Skills | It is production wallet infrastructure used to build many agent wallets. Count it as a candidate if your comparison is “agent wallet backends,” not packaged agent experiences |
| Privy | TEE wallets, policy rules, quorum approval, Agent CLI/sandbox and framework-specific skills | It now has strong agent-facing tooling, but it remains an application wallet platform: the developer assembles the agent's actions, screening and user experience |
| Crossmint | Wallet APIs, funding, checkout, credentials and payment infrastructure for users and agents | It is the platform underneath agent products. Lobster.cash is the concrete Crossmint-maintained agent wallet compared above |
| Stripe MPP | HTTP 402 payments using scoped card tokens or stablecoins, with fiat settlement into Stripe balances | It is a payment protocol and merchant rail, not a wallet. Link Agent Wallet is the consumer wallet that can issue its card tokens |
Turnkey and Privy are the closest calls: both market agent wallets, protect keys in enclaves and enforce policy before signing. They stay in the infrastructure section because the product team still defines the action set, screening and user experience.
The decision rule
Choose the narrowest authority that still lets the agent do its job. Use hardware approval when a human can be present. For unattended work, use a signer that independently enforces target, function, asset, amount, rate and expiry; add simulation and reputation checks; keep discovery separate from the trusted contract registry; and make revocation work without the agent.
The best agent wallet is the one whose failure mode you can explain before you fund it.
Product behavior and availability were checked against first-party documentation and public repositories on 24 September 2026. Agent-wallet products are changing quickly; recheck the linked source on each card before deploying.